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2Incumbent audit firm-provided tax services and clients with low financial reporting quality
Abstract
This study investigates whether incumbent audit firm-provided tax services enhance or impair
the likelihood of acknowledging client companies’ low financial reporting quality. In particular,
we examine the association between tax-related fees and the likelihood of timely restatements,
and internal control weakness disclosures among a sample of US companies that all have mis-
statements in financial information. The empirical findings indicate that companies paying high-
er tax-related fees are less likely to disclose SOX 404 internal control weakness disclosures, im-
plying that underlying control problems are unacknowledged when incumbent audit firm-
provided tax-related fees are higher. However, the findings suggest that just providing both audit
and tax-related services does not have an impact on audit quality per se, but rather it is the mag-
nitude of the tax-related fees in particular that counts. We also find some evidence suggesting
that companies paying higher tax-related fees have higher likelihood of restatement lags, where-
as companies paying smaller tax-related fees to their audit firm restate financial statements in a
timelier manner. Overall, the findings suggest that audit scrutiny of client companies with low
quality financial reporting is weaker when the magnitude of tax-related fees is higher.
31. INTRODUCTION
This study investigates whether incumbent audit firm-provided tax services enhance or im-
pair the likelihood of acknowledging client companies’ low financial reporting quality. Since the
audit scandal of Arthur Andersen, investors and regulators have expressed their concerns over
the magnitude of incumbent audit firm-provided non-audit services, because they are perceived
as a threat on auditors’ independence. That is, non-audit services might increase auditors’ eco-
nomic dependence to their clients, leading to lower audit quality. In the U.S., the Sarbanes Oxley
Act (SOX) (2002) prohibits audit firms from providing most non-audit services to their audit cli-
ents, but permits tax services due to the potential benefits from knowledge spillover to audit
quality. After all, audit quality consists of both the likelihood that the auditor discovers a breach
(implying expertise and audit effort) and the likelihood that the auditor discloses the breach (im-
plying objectivity and independence) (DeAngelo 1981).
A bulk of prior studies have investigated the association between non-audit fees and au-
dit/financial reporting quality, and reported somewhat mixed results (see Schneider et al. 2006
for a review). After the restrictions on most incumbent audit firm-provided non-audit services
(SOX 2002), prior research has especially focused on the influence of tax services in order to
examine whether the expected benefits from knowledge spillover outweighs the problems of
economic dependence (e.g., Seetharaman et al. 2011; Krishnan and Visvanathan 2011; Paterson
and Valencia 2011). In this study, we approach the issue of incumbent audit firm-provided tax
services using a sample of companies that all have poor financial reporting quality, i.e., compa-
nies with misstatements eventually restated. The misstatements are determined from the restated
periods indicated by restatement data. Firstly, we investigate whether tax fees are associated with
those misstatements in financial information that remain undiscovered in a fiscal year in ques-
4tion, to which we refer as restatement lag. We hence compare companies with restatement lag to
those companies with misstatements restated more quickly. Secondly, we investigate whether tax
fees are associated with the likelihood of Section 404 internal control weakness disclosures.
Based on the view that an occurrence of a misstatement indicates existing internal control weak-
nesses (e.g., Eilifsen and Messier 2000; Rice and Weber 2012), disclosing material weakness
would suggest that the company acknowledges the control weaknesses. The research setting
where we have a sample of similar companies in terms of poor accounting quality, allows exam-
ining the auditors’ professional skepticism in particular.1 Thus, the underlying assumption is that
high quality auditing should lead to discovering any material misstatements and internal control
weaknesses, and auditors should require management to acknowledge them. Enhanced
knowledge about the client via tax-services could make restatements more timely and material
weakness disclosures more likely for companies with poor accounting quality. However, eco-
nomic dependence may disrupt auditor’s professional skepticism, resulting in restatement lags
and unacknowledged control problems.
The inferences of the findings in prior studies that investigate the association between in-
cumbent audit firm-provided tax services and financial reporting quality mostly support the
knowledge spillover view. For example, Kinney et al. (2004) suggest that tax-related fees reduce
the likelihood of restatements, implying the benefits from knowledge spillover. Seetharaman et
al. (2011), however, report insignificant association between tax-related fees and restated peri-
ods, but significant negative association with tax-related restatements. These studies examine
whether or not restatements/misstatements occur. Harris and Zhou (2013) suggest that tax ser-
1 Nelson (2009) defines professional skepticism as “indicated by auditor judgments and decisions that reflect a
heightened assessment of the risk that an assertion is incorrect, conditional on the information available to the audi-
tor.” He elaborates that “In many circumstances the assertion in question will be a client’s assertion that the finan-
cial statements are free of material misstatement, but the definition could apply to other assertions as well (e.g.,
attesting to the effectiveness of a client’s internal controls).”
5vices lead to reductions of non-tax internal control weaknesses but do not have an effect on tax-
related weaknesses. Lower likelihood of restatements and/or internal control weaknesses could,
however, also mean reluctance to acknowledge and disclose them. Rice and Weber (2012) exam-
ine a sample of companies with existing internal control weaknesses and find that non-audit fees
makes it less likely that material weaknesses are disclosed, supporting the economic dependence
view. We extend the findings of the prior studies on tax services and investigate the role of audit
firm-provided tax services among companies with poor financial reporting quality.
This study uses a sample of fiscal-year observations of US companies from 2005-2012.
Only the company-years involving misstatements are included to the sample used in the anal-
yses. In the analyses, we examine the probability of a restatement lag (an indicator variable for
company-years where restatement is disclosed after the filing date of internal control opinion)
and the probability of internal control material weakness disclosure (an indicator variable for in-
ternal control reports disclosing material weaknesses). Our independent variables of interest are
(1) an indicator variable with a value of one if the tax fees paid to the incumbent auditor are
greater than zero, and zero otherwise (DTAXFEES), (2) the tax fees paid to the incumbent audi-
tor divided by square root of total assets (TAXFEES), (3) the ratio of tax fees divided by total
fees paid to the incumbent auditor (TAXFEES_TF), and (4) the ratio of tax fees divided by audit
fees paid to the incumbent auditor (TAXFEES_AF).
The empirical findings of this study suggest that, in all different model specifications, the
indicator variable for tax services is insignificant. This implies that incumbent audit firm-
provided tax services do not have either quality-enhancing or quality-impairing impact. Howev-
er, the results indicate that the continuous variables measuring the magnitude of tax-related fees
(TAXFEES, TAXFEES_AF, and TAXFEES_AF) have negative effects on the likelihood of a ma-
6terial weakness disclosure, although the significance levels vary across different model specifica-
tions. That is, we find evidence implying that the higher (proportional) magnitude of tax fees re-
sults in unacknowledged control problems. In most model specifications, tax-related fees are not
associated with the likelihood of restatement lags. However, when we further examine the im-
pact of tax-related fees using a sample of only those companies that have paid tax-related fees to
their auditors (i.e., observations of zero tax fees are excluded), the results indicate that tax fees
divided by total fees and tax fees divided by audit fees are (mostly marginally) significantly as-
sociated with higher likelihood of restatement lags and lower likelihood of material weakness
disclosures. These findings support the inference that it is the magnitude of the fees in particular
that impair the likelihood of acknowledging client companies’ financial reporting problems. In
sum, this study contributes to the literature investigating incumbent audit firm-provided non-
audit fees by suggesting that, among companies with poor accounting quality, greater economic
bond with the client due to higher levels of tax-related fees may jeopardize auditors’ independ-
ence and impair auditor’s professional skepticism.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section summarizes the literature on
the relation between non-audit services and financial reporting quality, and develops the hypoth-
eses. Section three describes the data and the methodology. Results are reported in section four,
followed by conclusions.
2. BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT
During the past 30 years, audit firms have expanded their business areas to consultancy
services, such as taxation, mergers and acquisitions, and risk management. Audit quality research
has investigated the possible benefits and disadvantages of an audit firm providing both audit and
non-audit services to the same client on a concurrent basis. There are two conflicting hypotheses
7of the association between incumbent auditor-provided non-audit services and audit quality.
Knowledge spillover view suggests that information acquired in consulting flows to the audit
partner, improving the quality of the audit (and vice versa) (e.g., Simunic 1984). However, these
services are economically important to the audit firms. High non-audit fees increase auditor’s
economic dependence on the clients, thereby possibly impairing audit quality (e.g., Simunic
1984).2
Prior studies have reported mixed results on the association between non-audit fees and
audit/financial reporting quality (see Schneider et al. 2006 for a review). While the findings of
Frankel et al. (2002), Ferguson et al. (2004), and Kanagaretnam et al. (2011) imply that non-
audit fees impair auditor independence, DeFond et al. (2002), Ashbaugh et al. (2003), Chung and
Kallapur (2003), Raghunandan et al. (2003), and Reynolds et al. (2004) do not find a statistically
significant association between non-audit fees and audit/financial reporting quality.
The findings of an experiment by Joe and Vandervelde (2007) indicate that although
knowledge spillover improves audit risk assessment, auditors seem to be less skeptical in identi-
fying specific factors indicative of fraud when they provide both audit and non-audit services.
Rice and Weber (2012) examine a sample of companies with existing internal control weakness-
es and find that non-audit fees make it less likely that material weaknesses are disclosed. Their
findings hence support the economic dependence view. Prior research has also investigated mar-
ket perceptions of incumbent audit firm-provided non-audit services (e.g., Krishnan et al. 2005;
Francis and Ke 2006; Khurana and Raman 2006), and the findings generally imply that investors
perceive non-audit services impairing auditor independence.
2 As defined by DeAngelo (1981), audit quality consists of both the likelihood that the auditor discovers a breach
and the likelihood that the auditor discloses the breach.
8In 2002, the U.S. Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX), which involves greater
regulation on audit firms, among other things. In order to enhance audit quality by securing audi-
tor independence, SOX provisions and SEC rules have prohibited audit firms from offering audit
and certain non-audit services to the same client on a concurrent basis. Because of potential ben-
efits from knowledge spillover, tax services are permitted, but with specific requirements for
providing such services. For example, an audit committee must approve in advance all audit
firm-provided tax services, tax-related fees paid to the audit firm must be reported separately,
and there are limitations to the scope of the tax consulting (SEC 2003; PCAOB 2005).
There are some prior studies examining the effects of tax services on client’s financial re-
porting quality. The underlying assumption in most of these studies is that higher quality audit-
ing ought to manifest in higher quality financial reporting by the client company. Kinney et al.
(2004) find a negative association between restatements of financial statements and tax fees.
They interpret this result as suggesting that there are benefits from tax consulting to the audit
quality. Seetharaman et al. (2011) examine the association between restated periods and tax-
related fees, but do not find statistically significant results. However, they report a significant
negative relation, when the restatements relate to tax issues. Choi and Lee (2009) find that in-
cumbent audit firm-provided tax services are associated with lower client discretionary accruals.
Huang et al. (2007) find mostly insignificant associations between tax fees and proxies for finan-
cial reporting quality (some weak evidence of lower abnormal accruals, but insignificant associa-
tion with meeting or beating earnings benchmarks). Krishnan and Visvanathan (2011) suggest
that  tax services  have a  negative impact  on loss  avoidance.  Gleason and Mills  (2011)  find im-
provement in estimates for tax reserves when the audit firm also provides tax services. Harris and
Zhou (2013) suggest that tax services lead to reductions of non-tax internal control weaknesses
9but do not have an effect on tax-related weaknesses. In addition to the studies examining the cli-
ent company’s financial reporting quality, Robinson (2008) finds a positive association between
tax fees and the likelihood that the auditor issues a going concern opinion prior to bankruptcy
filing. In summary, these studies support the view of knowledge spillover or find insignificant
associations. However, a few prior studies have found indications suggesting that tax fees may
have a negative effect on audit quality. Using an experiment, Favere-Marchesi (2006) find that
the joint provision of audit and tax services lead to significantly lower fraud-risk assessments.
Paterson and Valencia (2011) find that recurring audit firm-provided tax services create
knowledge spillover, but nonrecurring tax services seem to have a detrimental impact on auditor
independence.
In this study, we approach the issue of incumbent audit firm-provided tax services using a
sample of companies with poor financial reporting quality, i.e., companies with misstatements.
The misstatements are determined from restatement data, and the focus is on the restated periods.
Rather than examining the years of restatement announcements, it is more appropriate to concen-
trate on the restated periods including misstatement in order to determine the company-years
with poor accounting quality. First, we investigate whether tax-related fees are associated with
those misstatements in financial information that remain undiscovered in a fiscal year in ques-
tion, to which we refer as restatement lag. Second, we investigate whether tax-related fees are
associated with the likelihood of internal control weakness disclosures among companies with
misstatements. SOX Section 404 requires the management of listed companies to disclose their
assessment on the effectiveness of internal control over financial reporting.3 The underlying as-
3 This section became effective for accelerated filers in 2004. In addition to the management assessment, Section
404 requires the company’s external auditor to attest the assessment. Since 2007 smaller listed companies have also
been annually reporting their assessment of internal control effectiveness, but auditor’s internal control disclosure is
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sumption is that an occurrence of a misstatement indicates internal control weaknesses (e.g., Ei-
lifsen and Messier 2000; Leone 2007; Rice and Weber 2012). Therefore, utilizing a sample of
companies with misstatements (eventually restated), we examine whether tax fees has an impact
on whether or not company has disclosed the existing material weaknesses.
This research setting where we utilize a sample of companies that all have low financial
reporting quality allows examining auditors’ professional skepticism in a context of joint provi-
sion of tax services and audit services. Given the cost (threat to auditor independence) and bene-
fit (knowledge spillover) associated with tax services, it is not obvious how tax services affect
audit quality. Enhanced knowledge about clients via tax services could make restatements more
timely and material weakness disclosures more likely in companies with poor accounting quality.
However, economic dependence might disrupt auditor’s professional skepticism, resulting in re-
statement lags and unacknowledged control problems. Thus, we state the following two hypothe-
ses without directional expectations:
H1: There is a significant association between restatement lag and incumbent audit firm-
provided tax services among companies with poor financial reporting quality.
H2: There is a significant association between disclosure of internal control weaknesses and in-
cumbent audit firm-provided tax services among companies with poor financial reporting quali-
ty.
3. DATA AND METHODOLOGY
3.1. Sample and model specification
not required. Thus, our sample includes company-year observations with both auditor internal control reports and
management-only internal control reports.
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The data used in this study consist of company-year observations of US listed companies from
years 2005–2012. We start the sample selection by gathering from Audit Analytics all the com-
panies located in the US that have issued the SOX Section 404 mandated internal control reports.
Then we obtain restatement data and audit fee data (also from Audit Analytics), and combine
these with the internal control data. Finally, we extract the financial data from Thomson Finan-
cial database.
The samples used in the analyses consist of companies with poor financial reporting qual-
ity based on occurrences of misstatements (eventually restated). Specifically, we examine the
restatement disclosure data, focusing on the restated periods, that is, the periods including mis-
statements. The restatement data include the period beginning and ending dates for which the
company is restating. The restatement can affect an entire fiscal year, multiple fiscal years, or
only a part of the fiscal year.
In order to investigate the first hypothesis, we estimate the following logit model4:
ܴܧܵܶ_ܮܣܩ = 	ߙ + 	ߚଵݐܽݔݏ݁ݎݒ݅ܿ݁ݏ	 + 	ߚଶܣܷܦܫܶܨܧܧܵ + 	 ߚଷܣܷܦܫܴܶܧܮܣܶܧܦ + ߚସܱܶܪܧܴܨܧܧܵ+ ߚହܤܫܩ4 + ߚ଺ܩܥ + ߚ଻ܣܥܪܣܰܩܧ + ߚ଼ܮܱܩܶܣ + ߚଽܮܱܩܰܤܵ + ߚଵ଴ܨܱܴܧܫܩܰ+ ߚଵଵܴܧܴܷܵܶܥܶ + ߚଵଶܣܥܳ + ߚଵଷܮܱܵܵ + ߚଵସܮܧܸ + ߚଵହܴܲܫܱܴܫܥܹ+ 	ܽ݊݊ݑ݈ܽ	݂݅ݔ݁݀	݂݂݁݁ܿݐݏ	 + 	݅݊݀ݑݏݐݎݕ	݂݅ݔ݁݀	݂݂݁݁ܿݐݏ + 	ߝ
(1)
The dependent variable in Model (1) is REST_LAG,  which is a dummy variable equal to
one if the restatement announcement took place after the filing date of internal control report,
and zero otherwise. If more than one restatement announcement affects the same fiscal-year,
REST_LAG is coded one only if each announcement date takes place after the filing date of in-
ternal control report. The rationale in the analyses using Model (1) is to compare company-years
where misstatements were more timely restated to those company-years where misstatements
4 Because we are estimating conditional probability, we use logistic analysis, where normal distributions of variables
are not required.
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were restated only at the later periods (restatement lag). We assume that better audit quality
would manifest in lower likelihood of restatement lags.
In order to investigate the second hypothesis, we estimate the following logit model:
ܯܹ404 = 	ߙ + 	ߚଵݐܽݔݏ݁ݎݒ݅ܿ݁ݏ	+ 	ߚଶܣܷܦܫܶܨܧܧܵ + 	ߚଷܣܷܦܫܴܶܧܮܣܶܧܦ + ߚସܱܶܪܧܴܨܧܧܵ+ ߚହܤܫܩ4 + ߚ଺ܩܥ + ߚ଻ܣܥܪܣܰܩܧ + ߚ଼ܮܱܩܶܣ + ߚଽܮܱܩܰܤܵ + ߚଵ଴ܨܱܴܧܫܩܰ+ ߚଵଵܴܧܴܷܵܶܥܶ + ߚଵଶܣܥܳ + ߚଵଷܮܱܵܵ + ߚଵସܮܧܸ + ߚଵହܴܲܫܱܴܫܥܹ+ 	ܽ݊݊ݑ݈ܽ	݂݅ݔ݁݀	݂݂݁݁ܿݐݏ	 + 	݅݊݀ݑݏݐݎݕ	݂݅ݔ݁݀	݂݂݁݁ܿݐݏ + 	ߝ
 (2)
The dependent variable in Model (2) is MW404, which is a dummy variable equal to one if
a company disclosed an internal control report indicating material weaknesses, and zero other-
wise. Since the sample used in the analyses consists of company-years with misstatements, mate-
rial weakness disclosures could be expected to indicate that control problems have been
acknowledged. The data on section 404 material weaknesses consists of both auditor internal
control reports and management-only reports (see also footnote three). The assumption is that, in
case of high quality auditing, auditors would require management to acknowledge existing mate-
rial weaknesses also when they are not issuing their own internal control report. Additionally, we
use the variable MW404FIRST, which is set to one, if a company discloses internal control mate-
rial weaknesses for the first time, and zero otherwise.
Both Model (1) and Model (2) include the same explanatory variables. Taxservices repre-
sents the four alternative variables for tax-related fees, which are examined separately in the
analyses: DTAXFEES is set as one, if tax-related fees are greater than zero, and zero otherwise;
TAXFEES measures the magnitude of tax fees, and is calculated by dividing tax-related fees paid
to the incumbent auditor by the square root of total assets (see Kinney et al. 2004);
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TAXFEES_TF is the ratio of tax-related fees paid to the incumbent auditor divided by total fees5;
TAXFEES_AF is the ratio of tax-related fees paid to the incumbent auditor divided by audit fees.
The control variables are adapted from prior studies investigating the likelihood of restated
financial statements (Seetharaman et al. 2011) and the non-disclosure of existing material weak-
nesses (Rice and Weber 2012). AUDITFEES controls for the effect of audit effort, and is calcu-
lated as audit fees scaled by the square root of total assets (see e.g., Kinney et al. 2004; Rice and
Weber  et  al.  2012).  Similarly,  audit  related  fees  (AUDITRELATED)  and  all  other  auditor  fees
(OTHERFEES) are scaled by the square root of total assets. To control for the effect of audit firm
size,  an indicator  variable  for  the Big 4 audit  firms (BIG4)  is  included  to  the  model  (see  e.g.,
Seetharaman et al. 2011). Indicator variables for going concern opinion (GC) and for change of
the signing audit firm from previous year (ACHANGE) are also included to the model. Company
size is controlled by including the natural logarithm of total assets (LOGTA) to the model (e.g.,
Seetharaman et al. 2011). Complex companies might have more difficulties to establish and
maintain higher quality accounting system. To control for the effect of company complexity, we
include to the model the natural logarithm of the number of business segments (LOGNBS) (e.g.,
Seetharaman et al. 2011). Moreover, we include to the model indicator variables for companies
reporting geographic segment(s) other than the U.S. (FOREIGN), restructuring expenses/charges
(RESTRUCT) and exemptions to the internal control assessment due to acquisition (ACQ).6 Poor-
ly performing companies may have more incentive to manage earnings, and/or have less resource
to maintain high quality accounting system. Thus, we add to the model an indicator variable for
companies reporting negative income in either previous or current company year (LOSS) to con-
trol for financial performance. On one hand, highly leveraged companies might try to avoid vio-
5 Total fees is the sum of audit fees, audit related fees, tax-related fees, and other fees.
6 This information is based on Audit Analytics data where it is indicated if exemptions to the assessment of internal
controls over financial reporting were identified.
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lating debt covenants by managing earnings (e.g., Seetharaman et al. 2011). On the other hand,
these companies might be under a closer monitoring leading to more conservative reporting (e.g.,
Seetharaman et al. 2011). Thus, we include to the model leverage (LEV) calculated as total debt
divided by total assets.7 Finally, we control for the disclosure of previous year’s internal control
effectiveness (PRIORICW). PRIORICW is set to one if a company identified internal control
weaknesses in the previous year based on either Section 404 disclosure or Section 302 quarterly
disclosure. SOX Section 302 relates to quarterly reporting and requires management to assess the
effectiveness of disclosure controls and procedures. Finally, year and industry (according to the
17 industry classifications by Fama and French) fixed effects control for temporal variation and
industry differences. All the variables used in the analyses are defined in Table 1.
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE
The analyses are conducted using 1) total sample of restated company-years and 2) sam-
ple of company-years where only first restated years are included. The number of observations in
the samples are the following8:
1) Total samples of restated company-years
o Model (1) used to examine the probability of a restatement lag: 2,749 observations
(1,343 unique companies)
o Model (2) used to examine the probability of a material weakness disclosure: 2,584
observations (1,312 unique companies). If a restated internal control report was is-
sued and the material weaknesses were stated only in the restated report, the observa-
tion is excluded from the sample.
7 Observations with LEV>1 are excluded to mitigate outliers.
8 Exclusions from the sample are primarily related to missing values on variables needed in the analyses, but also to
some extreme cases or possible data errors in financial dates (which are used to determine years including misstate-
ments) and inconsistencies in auditor names between datasets.
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§ Additionally, we examine the probability of a first time material weakness
disclosure: 2,262 observations (1,174 unique companies). If an internal con-
trol report indicating material weaknesses is issued repeatedly (i.e., other than
first time material weakness report), the observation is excluded from the
sample.
2) Sample of restated company-years: only first restated years included. A restatement may af-
fect multiple fiscal years. We conduct the analyses also using a sample where continuous
misstatement years have been excluded and examine only the first restated fiscal years.
o Model (1) used to examine the probability of a restatement lag: 1,374 observations
(1,096 unique companies)
o Model  (2) used to examine the probability of a material weakness disclosure: 1,297
observations (1,051 unique companies)
§ Additionally, investigation of first time material weaknesses: 1,131 observa-
tions (941 unique companies)
3.2. Descriptive statistics
The descriptive statistics of the variables used in the empirical analyses are presented in
Panel A of Table 2. The mean of the dependent variable REST_LAG indicates that 63 percent of
the sample observations are restatement lag observations. Moreover, 21 percent of the sample
observations include 404 material weaknesses and 10 percent first time material weaknesses. The
dummy variable for tax fees (DTAXFEES) indicates that 70 percent of the company-year obser-
vations include incumbent auditor-provided tax services. The means (medians) of tax fees scaled
by the square root of total assets (TAXFEES) is 0.165 (0.045), the ratio of tax fees to total fees
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(TAXFEES_TF) is 0.074 (0.039), and the ratio of tax fees to audit fees (TAXFEES_AF) is 0.105
(0.044). The means (medians) of audit fees divided by the square root of total assets (AFEES) is
1.596 (1.263), audit related fees divided by the square root of total assets (AUDITRELATED) is
0.124 (0.027), and other fees divided by the square root of total assets (OTHERFEES) is 0.028
(0.000). Seventy-three percent of the company-years are audited by one of the Big 4 audit firms,
seven percent of the sample observations have a going concern opinion, and approximately eight
percent have changed their signing auditor from previous year.
The average value of total assets is 9,730 million dollars with a median value of 735 mil-
lion. The average number of business segments is 2.625. Approximately 46 percent of the obser-
vations have foreign operations, 24 percent have reported restructuring expenses/charges, and 10
percent indicate an exception to the assessment of internal controls due to acquisition. In about
49 percent of the company-years, companies report a loss in either the current or previous year.
The mean (median) leverage is 0.247 (0.197). On average, 23 percent of the sample observations
have disclosed internal control weaknesses based on section 404 disclosure or 302 disclosure in
the previous year.
Panel B of Table 2 displays Pearson correlation coefficients among the selected variables.
The two highest correlations among the independent variables occur between BIG4 and LOGTA
(0.563), and TAXFEES and AUDITRELATED (0.462). The variance inflation factors (untabulat-
ed) do not indicate problems with multicollinearity.
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE
3.3. Univariate tests
Panel A of Table 3 reports the univariate results when the sample is partitioned into two
groups based on the restatement lag variable (REST_LAG). The mean differences examined are
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DTAXFEES, TAXFEES, TAXFEES_TF, and TAXFEES_AF. The statistical significances are
based on t-tests for continuous variables and chi-square test for dummy variables. The descrip-
tive test results for the total sample indicate that companies with restatement lags are more likely
to  have  tax  fees  (DTAXFEES is marginally significant difference at the 0.10 level), and have
higher proportions of tax fees to total fees (TAXFEES_TF)  and  tax  fees  to  audit  fees
(TAXFEES_AF) (significant at the 0.01 level) compared to companies with misstatements dis-
covered before filing the internal control report. Moreover, the results of a sample that includes
only the first restated years indicate that companies with restatement lags have higher tax-related
fees (TAXFEES, TAXFEES_TF, TAXFEES_AF).
Panel B of Table 3 reports the univariate results when the sample is partitioned into two
groups based on the material weakness disclosure variable (MW404). These descriptive results
indicate that companies disclosing material weaknesses have significantly lower tax-related fees
compared to those who do not acknowledge their control problems. In the total sample, the dif-
ferences are significant with the variables DTAXFEES, TAXFEES_TF, and TAXFEES_AF. In the
sample that includes only the first restated years, all the variables of tax-related fees are signifi-
cantly different between companies that disclose weaknesses and those that do not disclose them.
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE
4. RESULTS
We estimate Model (1) to test whether tax services are associated with the likelihood of a
restatement lag, and Model (2) to test whether tax services are associated with the likelihood of a
material weakness disclosure. The logistic regression results are reported in Table 4. Panel A of
Table 4 reports the results for the dummy variable of tax services (DTAXFEES). These results
indicate that in each model specification (REST_LAG, MW404, MW404FIRST), the indicator
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variable for tax-related fees is insignificant, suggesting that incumbent audit firm-provided tax-
services are not associated with audit quality.
Panel B of Table 4 reports the results for the continuous variable TAXFEES, which repre-
sents the magnitude of tax-related fees.  Columns (1) and (4) indicate that tax-related fees are not
associated with restatement lags. However, TAXFEES is marginally significantly associated with
lower likelihood of material weakness disclosures in the sample that includes only the first re-
stated years [column (5)]. Moreover, higher tax-related fees are negatively associated with the
likelihood of first time material weakness disclosures [columns (3) and (6)].
Panel  C  of  Table  4  reports  the  results  for  the  variable  tax-related  fees  to  total  fees
(TAXFEES_TF).  These results  show that TAXFEES_TF is not significantly associated with the
likelihood of restatement lags [columns (1) and (4)]. However, the results indicate that the pro-
portion of tax-related fees from total fees is significantly (at the 0.05 level) and negatively asso-
ciated with the likelihood of material weakness disclosures (columns (2), (3), (5), and (6)].
Panel D of Table 4 shows the results for the ratio of tax-related fees to audit fees.
TAXFEES_AF is significantly (at the 0.05 level) and positively associated with the likelihood of
restatement lags, but only in the total sample of misstatements [column (1)]. The results in col-
umns (3) and (6) suggest that the likelihood of first time material weakness disclosures is lower
when tax-related fees are higher.
INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE
Additionally, we estimate Model (1) and Model (2) for only those companies that have
paid tax-related fees to their audit firm. That is, we exclude from the sample those observations
where tax-related fees are zero. The results are reported in Table 5. These results indicate that the
magnitude of tax-related fees is associated with higher likelihood of restatement lags: TAXFEES
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is significant at the 0.05 level [column (4) of Panel A]; TAXFEES_TF is significant at the 0.10
level [columns (1) and (4) of Panel B]; TAXFEES_AF is significant at the 0.05 level [columns
(1) and (4) of Panel C]. Moreover, the magnitude of tax-related fees is associated with a lower
likelihood of material weakness disclosures: TAXFEES is significant at the 0.10 level [columns
(3), (5), (6) of Panel A]; TAXFEES_TF is significant at the 0.10 level [columns (2), (3), (6) of
Panel B] and significant at the 0.05 level [column (5) of Panel B]; TAXFEES_AF is significant at
the 0.10 level [column (3)].
INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE
In summary, we do find some evidence suggesting that companies paying higher tax-
related fees to their audit firm are more likely to have restatement lag of misstated financial
statement. The results show more consistently across different model specifications that tax-
related fees are associated with lower likelihood of material weakness disclosures. Especially the
higher proportion of tax fees over total fees or audit fees appears to have a significant influence
on the material weakness disclosures. However, providing tax-related services does not itself af-
fect the likelihood of restatement lags or material weakness disclosures. Rather it is the magni-
tude of the fees that counts.
The results of the control variables indicate that AUDITFEES is significantly and negative-
ly (positively) associated with the likelihood of restatement lag (material weakness disclosure) in
nearly every model specification, which suggests that higher audit effort leads to higher probabil-
ity that misstatements are restated and control problems acknowledged (e.g., Blankley et al.
2012). Surprisingly, the dummy variable for Big 4 audit firms is positive (negative) in restate-
ment lag (material weakness disclosure) estimations. Auditor change from previous year is nega-
tively (positively) associated with restatement lag (material weakness disclosure). Moreover, the
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indicator variable LOSS is negatively (positively) associated with restatement lags (material
weakness disclosures). Also restatement lag (material weakness disclosure) is less likely (more
likely) if control problems have been acknowledged in the previous year (PRIORICW). Other
control variables have more variation in their significance levels in different model specifica-
tions.
5. CONCLUSIONS
Although SOX (2002) prohibits most incumbent audit firm-provided non-audit services, tax ser-
vices remain allowed because of potential benefits from knowledge spillover. We have empiri-
cally examined whether tax-related fees paid to the incumbent auditor are associated with the
likelihood of 1) restatement lag of misstated financial statement and 2) material weakness disclo-
sure of misstatement companies. Collectively, our findings suggest that providing tax-related
services does not itself have a significantly positive or negative impact on audit quality. Howev-
er, the empirical findings of this study provide some evidence that higher levels of tax-related
fees are associated with restatement lags, and stronger evidence on the association between high-
er tax-related fees and unacknowledged internal control problems. That is, the findings of the
current study indicate that, among companies with misstatements in financial statements, the
misstatements and control problems are more likely to remain undiscovered during the fiscal
year in question when the tax-related fees paid to the audit firm are higher. These findings have
implications to regulators and company stakeholders as well as to audit profession.
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Table 1
Variable definitions
Variable Definition
REST_LAG A dummy variable with a value of one if the restatement announcement took place after thefiling date of internal control opinion, and zero otherwise.
MW404 A dummy variable with a value of one if a company disclosed weaknesses in internal controlsover financial reporting based on Section 404, and zero otherwise.
MW404FIRST A dummy variable with a value of one if a company disclosed weaknesses in internal controlsover financial reporting based on Section 404 for the first time, and zero otherwise.
DTAXFEES A dummy variable with a value of one if a company paid tax related fees to the auditor, zerootherwise.
TAXFEES Tax related fees paid to the incumbent auditor scaled by the square root of total assets.
TAXFEES_TF Tax related fees paid to the incumbent auditor scaled by total fees.
TAXFEES_AF Tax related fees paid to the incumbent auditor scaled by audit fees.
AFEES Audit fees scaled by the square root of total assets.
AUDITRELATED Audit related fees scaled by the square root of total assets.
OTHERFEES Other fees scaled by the square root of total assets.
BIG4 A dummy variable with a value of one if the auditor is one of the four largest audit firms, andzero otherwise.
GC A dummy variable with a value of one if a company received a going concern opinion, andzero otherwise.
ACHANGE A dummy variable with a value of one if the signing audit firm changed from the previousfiscal year, and zero otherwise.
LOGTA The natural logarithm of total assets
LOGNBS The natural logarithm of the number of business segments reported by the company.
FOREIGN A dummy variable with a value of one if a company reported geographic segment(s) otherthan the US, and zero otherwise.
RESTRUCT A dummy variable with a value of one if a company reported restructuring expenses / charges,and zero otherwise.
ACQ A dummy variables with a value of one if an exemption to the assessment of internal controlsindicates acquisition(s) during the past year, and zero otherwise.
LOSS A dummy variable with a value of one if the net income before extraordinary items is negativein year t or t-1, zero otherwise.
LEV Total debt divided by total assets
PRIORICW A dummy variable with a value of one if the company disclosed either Section 404 materialweaknesses or Section 302 weaknesses in the previous year, and zero otherwise.
YEAR A dummy variable for the fiscal years 2005–2012
INDUSTRY A dummy variable for Fama and French 17 industry classifications
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Table 2
Descriptive statistics
Panel A: Distributional statistics
Variable Mean Std. Min 25%tile Median 75%tile Max N
REST_LAG 0.628 0.483 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 2,749
MW404 0.214 0.410 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 2,584
MW404FIRST 0.103 0.303 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 2,262
DTAXFEES 0.696 0.460 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 2,749
TAXFEES 0.165 0.384 0.000 0.000 0.045 0.192 8.818 2,749
TAXFEES_TF 0.074 0.094 0.000 0.000 0.039 0.115 0.553 2,749
TAXFEES_AF 0.105 0.164 0.000 0.000 0.044 0.142 1.693 2,749
AFEES 1.596 1.379 0.029 0.717 1.263 2.052 24.417 2,749
AUDITRELATED 0.124 0.358 0.000 0.000 0.027 0.118 7.727 2,749
OTHERFEES 0.028 0.239 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 7.115 2,749
BIG4 0.730 0.444 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 2,749
GC 0.069 0.253 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 2,749
ACHANGE 0.084 0.277 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 2,749
Total assets (mil-
lions) 9729.710 96053.390 0.003 182.666 735.445 2728.510 3222422.000 2,749
Segments 2.625 1.809 1.000 1.000 2.000 4.000 10.000 2,749
FOREIGN 0.458 0.498 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 2,749
RESTRUCT 0.242 0.428 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 2,749
ACQ 0.101 0.302 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 2,749
LOSS 0.492 0.500 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 2,749
LEV 0.247 0.230 0.000 0.040 0.197 0.384 0.996 2,749
PRIORICW 0.225 0.418 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 2,749
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Panel B: Pearson’s correlations coefficients
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18
DTAXFEES (1) 0.284 0.525 0.425 0.081 0.054 0.028 0.222 -0.155 -0.171 0.262 0.158 0.194 0.098 0.034 -0.101 0.000 -0.096
TAXFEES (2) 0.627 0.709 0.299 0.462 0.287 0.141 -0.055 -0.068 0.105 0.120 0.174 0.141 0.025 0.004 -0.013 -0.044
TAXFEES_TF (3) 0.943 -0.018 0.055 0.023 0.121 -0.089 -0.086 0.136 0.093 0.097 0.089 0.014 -0.076 -0.002 -0.113
TAXFEES_AF (4) -0.014 0.235 0.163 0.096 -0.078 -0.071 0.123 0.091 0.079 0.078 0.012 -0.056 0.000 -0.101
AFEES (5) 0.171 0.068 0.184 0.016 -0.051 -0.067 0.123 0.378 0.271 0.079 0.145 -0.088 0.214
AUDITRELATED (6) 0.415 0.044 -0.016 -0.017 0.056 0.074 0.076 0.064 0.055 0.027 0.035 -0.010
OTHERFEES (7) 0.056 -0.027 -0.027 0.114 0.049 0.070 0.041 0.018 -0.005 -0.004 0.015
BIG4 (8) -0.321 -0.272 0.563 0.251 0.257 0.218 0.115 -0.204 0.082 -0.191
GC (9) 0.183 -0.458 -0.166 -0.157 -0.063 -0.091 0.256 0.063 0.194
ACHANGE (10) -0.253 -0.104 -0.104 -0.069 -0.054 0.131 0.002 0.139
LOGTA (11) 0.370 0.166 0.122 0.122 -0.344 0.175 -0.230
LOGNBS (12) 0.181 0.128 0.107 -0.148 0.077 -0.054
FOREIGN(13) 0.341 0.121 -0.068 -0.146 -0.025
RESTRUCT (14) 0.066 0.072 -0.020 -0.013
ACQ (15) -0.090 0.005 -0.054
LOSS (16) 0.085 0.166
LEV (17) -0.006
PRIORICW (18)
Notes:
See Table 1 for variable definitions.
Bold text in the Pearson correlations matrix indicates significance at the 0.05 level.
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Table 3
Univariate results
Panel A: Restatement lags
Total sample of restated
company-years
Sample of restated company-years:
only first restated year included
REST_LAG=1
n=1,727
REST_LAG=0
n=1,022
REST_LAG=1
n=908
REST_LAG=0
n=466
DTAXFEES 0.708 0.674 * 0.666 0.663
TAXFEES 0.170 0.156 0.161 0.126 **
TAXFEES_TF 0.080 0.066 *** 0.074 0.062 **
TAXFEES_AF 0.114 0.090 *** 0.107 0.082 ***
Panel B: Section 404 material weaknesses
Total sample of restated
company-years
Sample of restated company-years:
only first restated year included
MW404=1
n=554
MW404=0
n=2,030
MW404=1
n=281
MW404=0
n=1,016
DTAXFEES 0.610 0.724 *** 0.577 0.696 ***
TAXFEES 0.153 0.172 0.111 0.164 ***
TAXFEES_TF 0.054 0.080 *** 0.047 0.078 ***
TAXFEES_AF 0.075 0.114 *** 0.064 0.110 ***
Notes:
See Table 1 for the variable definitions. The statistical significances are based on t-tests for continuous variables and chi-square test for dummy vari-
ables.
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Table 4
Multivariate results
Panel A: The indicator variable for tax-related fees>0 (DTAXFEES)
Total sample of restated company-years Sample of restated company-years:only first restated year included
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variable REST_LAG MW404 MW404FIRST REST_LAG MW404 MW404FIRST
Est.
Wald
chi-
square Est.
Wald
chi-
square Est.
Wald
chi-
square Est.
Wald
chi-
square Est.
Wald
chi-
square Est.
Wald
chi-
square
DTAXFEES -0.063 0.44 -0.066 0.25 -0.226 1.75 -0.203 2.04 -0.103 0.30 -0.209 0.80
AUDITFEES -0.196 20.52 *** 0.417 51.52 *** 0.466 40.27 *** -0.264 17.73 *** 0.339 17.68 *** 0.247 6.48 ***
AUDITRELATED 0.150 1.39 -0.122 0.57 -0.009 0.00 0.455 5.32 ** -0.213 0.76 -0.226 0.26
OTHERFEES -0.196 0.75 0.032 0.03 -0.037 0.02 -0.130 0.20 -0.018 0.00 -1.500 1.41
BIG4 0.452 11.69 *** -0.845 27.07 *** -0.841 13.96 *** 0.922 26.40 *** -0.976 17.96 *** -1.023 9.42 ***
GC -0.159 0.72 0.601 6.61 ** 0.381 1.21 0.113 0.21 0.225 0.52 0.193 0.19
ACHANGE -0.518 9.85 *** 0.886 22.67 *** 1.083 20.65 *** -0.548 7.37 *** 1.044 16.00 *** 1.092 12.10 ***
LOGTA -0.014 0.24 -0.083 4.35 ** -0.121 4.92 ** -0.044 1.14 -0.059 1.01 -0.049 0.37
LOGNBS 0.095 2.13 -0.103 1.22 -0.036 0.09 0.133 1.67 0.122 0.76 0.126 0.47
FOREIGN 0.188 3.17 * -0.348 5.32 ** -0.384 3.92 ** 0.244 2.21 -0.501 4.95 ** -0.221 0.62
RESTRUCT 0.038 0.11 -0.099 0.39 -0.107 0.28 -0.268 2.66 -0.064 0.08 -0.025 0.01
ACQ 0.146 0.99 0.028 0.02 0.223 0.89 0.098 0.21 0.207 0.52 0.339 1.03
LOSS -0.214 4.93 ** 0.434 10.13 *** 0.484 7.39 *** -0.519 13.46 *** 0.846 18.04 *** 0.852 9.64 ***
LEV 0.221 1.26 -0.009 0.00 -0.114 0.10 0.205 0.50 -0.493 1.71 -0.468 0.88
PRIORICW -0.908 68.89 *** 1.113 77.44 *** -1.963 31.30 *** -0.409 5.70 ** 1.576 68.99 *** -1.247 7.42 ***
Intercept 0.088 0.17 -0.854 8.28 *** -1.326 11.19 *** 0.528 2.85 * -1.180 8.09 *** -1.790 9.85 ***
Annual fixed ef-
fects? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry fixed ef-
fects? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Likelihood ratio
Chi-Square 353.5  <.0001 612.1 <.0001 257.2 <.0001 185.4 <.0001 373.4 <.0001 119.7 <.0001
R2 0.12 0.21 0.11 0.13 0.25 0.10
N 2,749 2,584 2,262 1,374 1,297 1,131
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Panel B: The magnitude of tax-related fees (TAXFEES)
Total sample of restated company-years Sample of restated company-years:only first restated year included
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variable REST_LAG MW404 MW404FIRST REST_LAG MW404 MW404FIRST
Est.
Wald
chi-
square Est.
Wald
chi-
square Est.
Wald
chi-
square Est.
Wald
chi-
square Est.
Wald
chi-
square Est.
Wald
chi-
square
TAXFEES 0.132 1.16 -0.205 1.46 -0.394 3.16 * 0.389 2.22 -0.880 3.74 * -1.970 6.15 **
AUDITFEES -0.206 20.89 *** 0.431 49.89 *** 0.494 42.78 *** -0.292 18.91 *** 0.376 17.79 *** 0.318 8.12 ***
AUDITRELATED 0.090 0.37 -0.031 0.03 0.192 0.98 0.355 2.85 -0.153 0.31 -0.204 0.21
OTHERFEES -0.214 0.77 0.077 0.16 0.114 0.26 -0.098 0.12 -0.032 0.01 -1.603 1.51
BIG4 0.447 11.41 *** -0.845 27.05 *** -0.857 14.60 *** 0.904 25.52 *** -0.953 17.09 *** -0.980 8.67 ***
GC -0.158 0.70 0.605 6.69 *** 0.386 1.24 0.113 0.21 0.231 0.55 0.239 0.30
ACHANGE -0.506 9.52 *** 0.893 23.13 *** 1.102 21.05 *** -0.507 6.46 ** 1.035 15.89 *** 1.098 12.15 ***
LOGTA -0.017 0.38 -0.082 4.16 ** -0.120 4.78 ** -0.053 1.68 -0.057 0.93 -0.051 0.39
LOGNBS 0.091 1.98 -0.102 1.21 -0.033 0.07 0.125 1.48 0.128 0.84 0.148 0.64
FOREIGN 0.181 2.97 * -0.357 5.64 ** -0.407 4.45 ** 0.225 1.87 -0.506 5.08 ** -0.229 0.66
RESTRUCT 0.036 0.10 -0.101 0.40 -0.110 0.30 -0.274 2.75 * -0.056 0.06 0.035 0.01
ACQ 0.156 1.12 0.013 0.00 0.196 0.70 0.122 0.32 0.198 0.47 0.350 1.08
LOSS -0.213 4.89 ** 0.437 10.27 *** 0.496 7.75 *** -0.504 12.78 *** 0.827 17.06 *** 0.763 7.86 ***
LEV 0.223 1.28 -0.007 0.00 -0.094 0.07 0.197 0.46 -0.478 1.60 -0.425 0.72
PRIORICW -0.898 67.49 *** 1.104 75.72 *** -2.010 31.49 *** -0.384 4.98 ** 1.552 65.75 *** -1.305 7.70 ***
Intercept 0.072 0.12 -0.896 9.34 *** -1.456 13.81 *** 0.459 2.20 -1.207 8.41 *** -1.798 10.07 ***
Annual fixed ef-
fects? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry fixed ef-
fects? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Likelihood ratio
Chi-Square 354.1  <.0001 613.5 <.0001 259.1 <.0001 185.9 <.0001 378.4 <.0001 128.5 <.0001
R2 0.12 0.21 0.11 0.13 0.25 0.11
N 2,749 2,584 2,262 1,374 1,297 1,131
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Panel C: The ratio of tax-related fees to total fees (TAXFEES_TF)
Total sample of restated company-years Sample of restated company-years:only first restated year included
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variable REST_LAG MW404 MW404FIRST REST_LAG MW404 MW404FIRST
Est.
Wald
chi-
square Est.
Wald
chi-
square Est.
Wald
chi-
square Est.
Wald
chi-
square Est.
Wald
chi-
square Est.
Wald
chi-
square
TAXFEES_TF 0.700 2.40 -1.364 4.31 ** -2.350 5.28 ** 0.592 0.71 -2.356 5.25 ** -3.981 5.47 **
AUDITFEES -0.194 20.12 *** 0.412 50.44 *** 0.458 40.30 *** -0.268 17.74 *** 0.333 17.00 *** 0.238 5.85 **
AUDITRELATED 0.135 1.13 -0.099 0.40 0.047 0.06 0.428 4.73 ** -0.216 0.73 -0.256 0.30
OTHERFEES -0.186 0.66 0.029 0.02 -0.044 0.02 -0.102 0.12 -0.040 0.02 -1.651 1.62
BIG4 0.443 11.21 *** -0.839 26.33 *** -0.839 13.82 *** 0.911 26.03 *** -0.968 17.67 *** -1.000 9.07 ***
GC -0.156 0.68 0.592 6.45 ** 0.380 1.22 0.120 0.24 0.211 0.46 0.217 0.25
ACHANGE -0.499 9.22 *** 0.875 22.14 *** 1.082 20.48 *** -0.503 6.37 ** 1.013 15.22 *** 1.071 11.69 ***
LOGTA -0.017 0.38 -0.081 4.10 ** -0.119 4.70 ** -0.052 1.60 -0.056 0.93 -0.044 0.29
LOGNBS 0.089 1.90 -0.098 1.13 -0.033 0.07 0.126 1.51 0.125 0.80 0.137 0.54
FOREIGN 0.177 2.81 * -0.357 5.65 ** -0.396 4.24 ** 0.223 1.83 -0.511 5.18 ** -0.222 0.62
RESTRUCT 0.031 0.08 -0.092 0.34 -0.095 0.22 -0.268 2.64 -0.062 0.08 -0.003 0.00
ACQ 0.153 1.09 0.014 0.00 0.202 0.75 0.117 0.30 0.195 0.46 0.329 0.97
LOSS -0.211 4.79 ** 0.427 9.84 *** 0.467 6.91 *** -0.510 13.08 *** 0.821 16.83 *** 0.785 8.23 ***
LEV 0.222 1.28 -0.008 0.00 -0.106 0.09 0.193 0.44 -0.461 1.50 -0.442 0.80
PRIORICW -0.898 67.50 *** 1.104 75.99 *** -1.981 31.54 *** -0.397 5.33 *** 1.563 68.01 *** -1.259 7.50 ***
Intercept 0.021 0.01 -0.800 7.53 *** -1.295 11.08 *** 0.419 1.84 -1.080 6.70 *** -1.668 9.01 ***
Annual fixed ef-
fects? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry fixed ef-
fects? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Likelihood ratio
Chi-Square 355.2 <.0001 616.1 <.0001 261.6 <.0001 184.0 <.0001 378.2 <.0001 126.1 <.0001
R2 0.12 0.21 0.11 0.13 0.25 0.11
N 2,749 2,584 2,262 1,374 1,297 1,131
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Panel D: The ratio of tax-related fees to audit fees (TAXFEES_AF)
Total sample of restated company-years Sample of restated company-years:only first restated year included
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variable REST_LAG MW404 MW404FIRST REST_LAG MW404 MW404FIRST
Est.
Wald
chi-
square Est.
Wald
chi-
square Est.
Wald
chi-
square Est.
Wald
chi-
square Est.
Wald
chi-
square Est.
Wald
chi-
square
TAXFEES_AF 0.570 4.56 ** -0.644 2.54 -1.330 4.59 ** 0.594 2.08 -0.992 1.90 -2.286 3.49 *
AUDITFEES -0.192 19.69 *** 0.412 50.62 *** 0.458 40.27 *** -0.266 17.49 *** 0.332 17.22 *** 0.234 5.81 **
AUDITRELATED 0.087 0.46 -0.063 0.15 0.114 0.36 0.384 3.73 * -0.171 0.43 -0.211 0.21
OTHERFEES -0.210 0.74 0.050 0.07 0.041 0.02 -0.102 0.12 -0.021 0.01 -1.593 1.53
BIG4 0.444 11.21 *** -0.844 26.80 *** -0.846 14.10 *** 0.909 25.86 *** -0.970 17.83 *** -1.007 9.18 ***
GC -0.155 0.67 0.594 6.47 ** 0.379 1.21 0.120 0.24 0.217 0.49 0.210 0.24
ACHANGE -0.498 9.23 *** 0.881 22.46 *** 1.088 20.65 *** -0.502 6.36 *** 1.033 15.76 *** 1.082 11.86 ***
LOGTA -0.018 0.41 -0.082 4.18 ** -0.118 4.68 ** -0.052 1.62 -0.058 0.99 -0.046 0.31
LOGNBS 0.088 1.85 -0.100 1.17 -0.034 0.08 0.125 1.47 0.124 0.78 0.135 0.53
FOREIGN 0.177 2.83 * -0.358 5.66 ** -0.401 4.35 ** 0.222 1.83 -0.511 5.21 ** -0.229 0.66
RESTRUCT 0.029 0.07 -0.094 0.35 -0.102 0.26 -0.270 2.67 -0.063 0.08 -0.012 0.00
ACQ 0.157 1.14 0.015 0.01 0.201 0.74 0.121 0.32 0.197 0.47 0.332 0.99
LOSS -0.212 4.82 ** 0.432 10.04 *** 0.478 7.23 *** -0.508 12.95 *** 0.830 17.29 *** 0.799 8.55 ***
LEV 0.226 1.32 -0.012 0.00 -0.103 0.08 0.190 0.43 -0.476 1.60 -0.440 0.80
PRIORICW -0.898 67.62 *** 1.108 76.72 *** -1.980 31.50 *** -0.392 5.19 ** 1.563 68.04 *** -1.256 7.50 ***
Intercept 0.016 0.01 -0.827 8.09 *** -1.339 11.89 *** 0.405 1.72 -1.135 7.60 *** -1.710 9.59 ***
Annual fixed ef-
fects? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry fixed ef-
fects? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Likelihood ratio
Chi-Square 357.1 <.0001 614.5 <.0001 260.6 <.0001 185.2 <.0001 375.6 <.0001 124.3 <.0001
R2 0.12 0.21 0.11 0.13 0.25 0.10
N 2,749 2,584 2,262 1,374 1,297 1,131
Notes:
See Table 1 for variable definitions. Statistical significances based on two-tailed tests at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels are denoted by ***, **, and *, respec-
tively. Statistical significances are calculated by clustering the standard errors within companies (Petersen 2009). For brevity, the results for the industry and year fixed effects
are not reported.
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Table 5
Additional tests: Only observations with tax related fees>0 (DTAXFEES=1)
Panel A: The magnitude of tax-related fees (TAXFEES)
Total sample of restated company-years Sample of restated company-years:only first restated year included
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variable REST_LAG MW404 MW404FIRST REST_LAG MW404 MW404FIRST
Est.
Wald
chi-
square Est.
Wald
chi-
square Est.
Wald
chi-
square Est.
Wald
chi-
square Est.
Wald
chi-
square Est.
Wald
chi-
square
TAXFEES 0.195 1.91 -0.234 1.97 -0.372 2.83 * 0.671 4.17 ** -1.007 3.19 * -1.957 3.62 *
AUDITFEES -0.226 17.41 *** 0.455 40.85 *** 0.521 30.96 *** -0.318 13.66 *** 0.405 16.87 *** 0.364 4.26 **
AUDITRELATED 0.159 0.95 -0.054 0.09 0.212 0.70 0.353 2.12 0.012 0.00 -0.065 0.03
OTHERFEES -0.455 3.82 * 0.337 1.93 0.273 1.10 -0.951 1.08 0.766 0.40 0.581 0.14
BIG4 0.551 9.39 *** -1.213 31.61 *** -1.248 19.35 *** 1.081 19.80 *** -1.442 20.37 *** -1.777 16.99 ***
GC -0.606 4.10 ** 0.634 3.36 * 0.381 0.46 -0.469 1.58 0.540 1.33 0.538 0.54
ACHANGE -0.438 3.14 * 0.483 2.76 * 0.587 2.32 -0.315 0.97 0.242 0.26 0.315 0.31
LOGTA -0.056 2.36 -0.049 0.94 -0.062 0.73 -0.088 2.46 0.002 0.00 0.035 0.10
LOGNBS 0.163 3.99 ** -0.078 0.48 -0.132 0.70 0.069 0.26 0.352 3.51 * 0.351 1.77
FOREIGN 0.086 0.42 -0.408 4.77 ** -0.575 5.08 ** 0.102 0.22 -0.817 6.74 *** -0.501 1.28
RESTRUCT 0.127 0.90 -0.113 0.36 -0.042 0.03 -0.153 0.52 -0.145 0.26 -0.199 0.25
ACQ 0.272 2.49 -0.185 0.56 -0.028 0.01 0.488 3.43 * 0.105 0.08 0.392 0.76
LOSS -0.259 4.54 ** 0.523 8.99 *** 0.566 6.11 ** -0.571 10.46 *** 0.976 12.78 *** 0.988 7.39 ***
LEV 0.181 0.50 0.144 0.18 -0.044 0.01 0.209 0.30 -0.279 0.28 -0.274 0.17
PRIORICW -1.079 61.37 *** 1.129 52.57 *** -2.202 19.24 *** -0.599 7.20 *** 1.598 36.29 *** -1.417 4.47 **
Intercept 0.239 0.75 -1.102 8.36 *** 0.194 0.48 0.524 1.76 -1.493 7.37 *** -2.479 9.55 ***
Annual fixed ef-
fects? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry fixed ef-
fects? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Likelihood ratio
Chi-Square 293.5  <.0001 388.2 <.0001 175.0 <.0001 169.4 <.0001 246.0 <.0001 100.8 <.0001
R2 0.14 0.19 0.10 0.17 0.25 0.12
N 1,912 1,807 1,612 914 869 773
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Panel B: The ratio of tax-related fees to total fees (TAXFEES_TF)
Total sample of restated company-years Sample of restated company-years:only first restated year included
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variable REST_LAG MW404 MW404FIRST REST_LAG MW404 MW404FIRST
Est.
Wald
chi-
square Est.
Wald
chi-
square Est.
Wald
chi-
square Est.
Wald
chi-
square Est.
Wald
chi-
square Est.
Wald
chi-
square
TAXFEES_TF 1.051 3.51 * -1.483 3.67 * -2.070 2.95 * 1.530 2.97 * -3.182 5.21 ** -4.623 3.69 *
AUDITFEES -0.199 15.19 *** 0.422 39.83 *** 0.463 26.78 *** -0.258 10.83 *** 0.325 13.76 *** 0.208 2.66
AUDITRELATED 0.228 2.87 * -0.140 0.66 0.040 0.03 0.454 4.29 ** -0.100 0.24 -0.115 0.11
OTHERFEES -0.396 3.50 * 0.262 1.23 0.177 0.39 -0.940 1.04 0.707 0.34 0.617 0.16
BIG4 0.549 9.28 *** -1.213 31.10 *** -1.235 18.70 *** 1.090 20.33 *** -1.460 21.22 *** -1.767 17.32 ***
GC -0.612 4.17 ** 0.632 3.38 * 0.382 0.47 -0.464 1.55 0.530 1.28 0.539 0.56
ACHANGE -0.443 3.20 * 0.475 2.62 0.591 2.36 -0.319 1.00 0.220 0.20 0.268 0.23
LOGTA -0.054 2.14 -0.052 1.08 -0.070 0.93 -0.083 2.22 -0.006 0.01 0.030 0.08
LOGNBS 0.161 3.94 ** -0.079 0.49 -0.130 0.69 0.071 0.28 0.339 3.28 * 0.336 1.63
FOREIGN 0.087 0.43 -0.419 5.05 ** -0.570 5.13 ** 0.101 0.22 -0.831 7.00 *** -0.488 1.29
RESTRUCT 0.121 0.81 -0.097 0.26 -0.015 0.00 -0.138 0.43 -0.160 0.32 -0.264 0.42
ACQ 0.265 2.41 -0.179 0.53 -0.005 0.00 0.476 3.29 * 0.112 0.10 0.371 0.70
LOSS -0.256 4.40 ** 0.512 8.65 *** 0.542 5.63 ** -0.576 10.65 *** 0.958 12.26 *** 1.003 7.55 ***
LEV 0.178 0.48 0.152 0.20 -0.031 0.00 0.185 0.23 -0.244 0.22 -0.255 0.15
PRIORICW -1.081 61.83 *** 1.131 52.99 *** -2.161 18.75 *** -0.615 7.62 *** 1.616 38.25 *** -1.356 4.07 **
Intercept 0.099 0.12 -0.905 5.53 ** -1.486 7.55 *** 0.361 0.80 -1.148 4.10 ** -2.100 7.19 ***
Annual fixed ef-
fects? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry fixed ef-
fects? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Likelihood ratio
Chi-Square 295.1 <.0001 389.9 <.0001 175.6 <.0001 167.0 <.0001 246.3 <.0001 99.8 <.0001
R2 0.14 0.19 0.10 0.17 0.25 0.12
N 1,912 1,807 1,612 914 869 773
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Panel C: The ratio of tax-related fees to audit fees (TAXFEES_AF)
Total sample of restated company-years Sample of restated company-years:only first restated year included
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variable REST_LAG MW404 MW404FIRST REST_LAG MW404 MW404FIRST
Est.
Wald
chi-
square Est.
Wald
chi-
square Est.
Wald
chi-
square Est.
Wald
chi-
square Est.
Wald
chi-
square Est.
Wald
chi-
square
TAXFEES_AF 0.755 5.71 ** -0.646 1.99 -1.211 2.99 * 1.059 4.44 ** -1.168 1.81 -2.238 2.11
AUDITFEES -0.195 14.61 *** 0.423 39.92 *** 0.463 26.69 *** -0.253 10.52 *** 0.328 14.13 *** 0.210 2.81 *
AUDITRELATED 0.160 1.29 -0.095 0.29 0.130 0.29 0.372 2.73 * -0.005 0.00 -0.031 0.01
OTHERFEES -0.453 4.53 ** 0.302 1.53 0.264 1.03 -0.994 1.16 0.848 0.49 0.794 0.27
BIG4 0.549 9.24 *** -1.216 31.59 *** -1.235 18.76 *** 1.086 20.14 *** -1.445 21.10 *** -1.750 17.30 ***
GC -0.608 4.13 ** 0.627 3.32 * 0.375 0.45 -0.464 1.57 0.518 1.23 0.497 0.48
ACHANGE -0.444 3.22 * 0.473 2.61 0.588 2.34 -0.326 1.04 0.230 0.23 0.275 0.24
LOGTA -0.054 2.14 -0.051 1.05 -0.067 0.86 -0.083 2.20 -0.005 0.00 0.036 0.10
LOGNBS 0.160 3.87 ** -0.079 0.49 -0.131 0.70 0.069 0.26 0.341 3.31 * 0.322 1.50
FOREIGN 0.088 0.45 -0.412 4.89 ** -0.574 5.18 ** 0.101 0.22 -0.805 6.60 ** -0.472 1.21
RESTRUCT 0.118 0.78 -0.101 0.29 -0.020 0.01 -0.141 0.45 -0.163 0.33 -0.291 0.52
ACQ 0.270 2.47 -0.176 0.51 -0.012 0.00 0.482 3.38 * 0.103 0.08 0.352 0.63
LOSS -0.257 4.44 ** 0.518 8.82 *** 0.549 5.77 ** -0.577 10.65 *** 0.981 12.91 *** 1.030 8.00 ***
LEV 0.186 0.53 0.138 0.17 -0.044 0.01 0.189 0.24 -0.293 0.31 -0.297 0.20
PRIORICW -1.082 62.18 *** 1.137 53.65 *** -2.159 18.83 *** -0.609 7.48 *** 1.620 38.76 *** -1.349 4.11 **
Intercept 0.099 0.12 -0.980 6.58 ** -1.559 8.52 *** 0.374 0.88 -1.355 6.18 ** -2.312 8.96 ***
Annual fixed ef-
fects? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry fixed ef-
fects? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Likelihood ratio
Chi-Square 297.1 <.0001 388.5 <.0001 175.5 <.0001 168.5 <.0001 243.1 <.0001 97.8 <.0001
Adj. R2 0.14 0.19 0.10 0.17 0.24 0.12
N 1,912 1,807 1,612 914 869 773
Notes:
See Table 1 for variable definitions. Statistical significances based on two-tailed tests at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels are denoted by ***, **, and *, respec-
tively. Statistical significances are calculated by clustering the standard errors within companies (Petersen 2009). For brevity, the results for the industry and year fixed effects
are not reported.
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